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We contribute to the corporate political activity (CPA) literature by showing that investors value 
companies that host visits of high ranking government officials (President and Premier). We 
argue that investors may value hosting firms for two reasons: (1) the signal received about 
possibility of firm accessing government-controlled resources via promotion or protection; and 
(2) the certification effect from such high powered visitors elevating the firm’s reputation and 
legitimacy. Results from an event study analysis of 84 high ranking government official visits in 
China from 2003 to 2011 indicate that investors responded positively to hosting firms, as 
reflected by stock market performance. Furthermore, the greatest positive reactions accrued to 
firms experiencing weaker prior period financial performance and to firms that are privately 





Do visits by high ranking government officials influence firm stock market performance? 
Studying a sample of Chinese public firms that hosted 84 visits by the Chinese President and the 
Premier from 2003 to 2011, we find that investors reacted positively to such visits compared 
with a group of non-hosting firms from the same industry and with similar financial performance 
and size. In addition, firms with weaker prior financial performance and private firms benefit the 
most from hosting such visits. Our findings imply that hosting visits of high ranking government 
officials can signal future government-controlled resource inflows and boost hosting firms’ 
reputation and legitimacy. 
 
 
Running title: High Ranking Official Visits and Stock Market Reactions  
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 Most of the corporate political activity (CPA) literature assumes that senior managers 
make conscious decisions to enter their companies into the policy arena (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Lux, Crook, and Woehr, 2011). Companies may choose to 
negotiate directly with government officials, such as through lobbying, to attempt to shape the 
public policies to complement their own assets and capabilities (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), 
support business strategies (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2013), and to pursue advantages over 
rivals (Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh, 2006). Firms may decide to use CPA to maintain 
organizational effectiveness (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) when facing uncertainties about access 
to government-controlled resources such as contracts and subsidies and to mitigate the effects of 
burdensome regulations (Birnbaum, 1985; Fremeth and Richter, 2011). Firms may opt to 
practice CPA to cultivate good relations and trust with government officials that might pay off in 
the future (Milyo, 2014; Mizruchi, 1992). The common assumption across these perspectives 
about CPA is one of strategic choice: that when operating in jurisdictions with strong formal 
institutions (North, 1990), many firms will consciously engage government officials positioned 
to craft rules and direct resources that might benefit them.  
 This study examines one form of CPA in which the choice of engagement is less clearly 
unidirectional: the practice of firms hosting visits of senior-level central government officials. 
We argue that visits represent an emergent CPA strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), where a 
confluence of firm political activities practiced over time and across levels of government 
position the firm to receive a visit. This new focus contributes to the CPA literature because it 
does not represent a deliberate effort to influence politicians, seek subsidies, or pursue regulatory 
change, but pertains instead to an activity that flows from pre-existing relationships (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999) between the firm’s managers and the government officials. For such visits, the 
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relationships between firms’ managers and government officials (and their staffs) are complex in 
that the firm generally has relationships with government officials from different levels of the 
government (i.e., local governments and local chapters of the political party) that pre-date the 
visit of the higher ranking official. Thus, while the consensus of the experts is that this particular 
form of CPA – the visit – is ultimately requested upon the firm by senior government officials, it 
is unlikely that the invitation is offered without prior relationships between the firm’s managers 
and officials at some levels of government.  
 For this study, we seek to understand whether third-party investors value the firms’ 
hosting visits, and if so, what information might visits convey such that investors bid up the 
hosting firms’ stock prices. Starting from the assumption that third parties face information 
asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973) about certain aspects of the firm that creates 
uncertainty about the firm’s future value, the visit offers information to such third parties. First, 
the visit might signal the resources that the government is able to direct in the future to the 
visited firm or its sector. Government-controlled resources, such as subsidies, taxes, and 
regulations, might be promotional in nature, aimed at promoting the firm’s products or services 
in domestic or international markets or protectionist, aimed at shielding weak firms or firms in 
distressed sectors from market conditions. Second, the visit might act as a form of certification 
(Shane & Foo, 1999) by government officials about the company, in which the hosting firm’s 
interaction with the President or the Premier – both high status exchange partners – elevates the 
firm’s reputation (Rindova et al., 2005) and legitimacy (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Both of 
these pathways also assume that high ranking government officials desire to visit companies with 
commercial activities congruent with their preferred public policies. 
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The context of our study, China, is particularly relevant to investigate the influence of 
high-level official visits on firm evaluation by investors. Specifically, we focus upon the stock 
market effects of Chinese companies that hosted visits of the two senior-most central 
government of China, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, during the period 2003–
2011. Both collectively possessed enormous substantive and symbolic power through their 
positions as head of state and head of the government and as primary leaders (i.e., General 
Secretary, Politburo members) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Kuhn, 2002). The visits 
of high ranking officials may result in offers of general praise and support about the economy or 
the sector, a collective outcome. For example, during a visit to several high tech companies and 
industrial parks in Shanghai in January of 2010, President Hu in a public speech emphasized the 
importance of research as a driver of sound and fast economic growth and social development 
(China View, 2010). Yet, visits may also signal the importance of only the hosting firm. For 
example, during his 2008 visit, Premier Wen publicly praised Baosteel’s R&D activities and 
product advances in their silicon steel products (Baosteel, 2008), a high-profile endorsement for 
the company from an industry lagging behind its international rivals in product quality and 
production efficiency (Ernst & Young, 2013). Though it may lag important global competitors, 
the firm provides necessary employment opportunities. In a country where the capital market is 
less developed and public firms’ disclosure is lacking, hosting visits may help investors reduce 
information asymmetry and better evaluate hosting firms’ possibilities of receiving future 
government-controlled resources as well as certifying the firm’s reputation and legitimacy. 
 The results of our analysis of 84 government official visits hosted by Chinese firms listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003–2011 show that, on average, firms witnessed 
statistically significant positive abnormal market returns by hosting the President’s and Premier’s 
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visits, outperforming a matched-set of non-hosting firms. The main result supports predictions 
that such visits convey valuable information to investors about expectations for future 
government-controlled resources and provide a boost to hosting firm’s reputation and legitimacy.  
Additionally, we consider several firm-level contingencies that may be related to 
investors’ perceptions about the firm’s access to government supplied resources and the 
certification effect about the firm’s reputation and legitimacy, including profitability, ownership 
type (private ownership versus state owned enterprise, SOE), top management’s political 
connections, and the institutional development in the location of the hosting firm. The results of 
the analysis of these contingency factors indicate that less profitable firms and privately-
controlled firms (not SOEs) witnessed higher levels of positive abnormal market returns. 
Compared with otherwise similar SOEs, less profitable and private firms may be less flexible in 
accessing financial resources and the visit may signal that the government will provide some sort 
of promotional or protective assistance because they typically receive less state support such as 
access to credits and other subsidies and experience more bureaucratic or regulatory burdens (Jia, 
2014). For firms facing challenges to their reputation, such as those with weaker profitability 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), and less socio-political legitimacy, such as being private rather 
than state-controlled, visits may signal to investors that the firm will continue to be a viable 
entity, a form of social validation (Rao, 1994). 
Our study contributes to the scholarly literature about CPA in three important ways. First, 
we examine company site visits, a form of CPA which allows a firm’s managers to make 
intimate contacts with high level officials. We argue that visits represent an emergent form of 
CPA, emanating from the firm’s long history of complex relations with government officials. 
Additionally, site visits are heavily publicized events, elevating the reputation and legitimacy of 
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the hosting firms more so than private meetings. Second, this paper considers the payoffs of 
emergent CPA in a context of an authoritarian state where firms face policy uncertainties due to 
power discrepancies and lack due process vis-a-vis governmental actors. This advances the CPA 
literature because it suggests that under such conditions hosting high profile government officials 
conveys information to third parties (i.e., investors) about expectations about the firm’s future 
access to government-controlled resources as well as its reputation and legitimacy. Third, this 
paper joins the emerging set of studies that examine private (as opposed to collective) CPA in 
China (Jia, 2014; Jia, Shi, and Wang, 2012; Kennedy, 2005; Li and Zhang, 2007) and other 
emerging countries (Henisz, 2000). With the rapid ascendance of emerging economy firms in the 
global economy, it is important for scholars to shed light on how firm-government interactions in 
these settings can influence firm value creation. 
INFORMATIONAL EFFECTS OF HOSTING VISITS  
 Before discussing the effects of visits on hosting firms, we briefly describe what we are 
able to observe about these visits by senior Chinese government officials. Visits of senior 
government officials garner extensive media coverage and may be considered as public relations 
events (Kennedy, 2005: 50). From reading Chinese news accounts (Appendix I provides a 
summary of ten visits), we observed that the President and the Premier were inclined to visit 
firms that appeared to represent exemplars of particular government policies. For example, on 
July 27, 2004, President Hu visited Shanghai International Port Group to support the 
governmental policy of “Scientific Outlook on Development.” During his October 22, 2005 visit 
to NARI Technology Co., Ltd., Premier Wen emphasized the importance of “Scientific Outlook 
on Development” and “Sustainable Development” policies to the company’s growth. News 
accounts recounted that the President and Premier also visited firms facing harsh external 
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conditions. For instance, during his visit to Sino-Platinum Co., Ltd. on July 26, 2009, President 
Hu encouraged the firm to capitalize on its own strengths to overcome the economic challenges 
triggered by the global financial crisis. In October of 2009, promoting economic reform policies 
during the global financial crisis, President Hu visited SHINVA, the first medical equipment 
manufacturing firm owned by the CCP, and encouraged its top managers and employees to 
strengthen their technology and service innovations. 
For this study, we have interviewed several experts in Chinese business-government 
relations and none of them could identify a set of rules or a protocol that governed such visits. 
Nothing official is published about hosting visits. These experts speculate that the choice of a 
visit ultimately comes from the office of the senior government officials, but involves a complex 
and long series of interactions between the company’s managers and various governmental 
officials across different levels of government, plus potentially non-governmental social 
interactions (e.g., born in the same city, common schooling, and common military service), such 
that the company becomes a target for such a visit. While companies are ultimately chosen by 
the government officials, the managers at the hosting companies may have taken prior actions to 
improve their chance of hosting visits. In contrast to determinant conceptions of CPA strategy, 
we argue that hosting visits represents an emergent (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) CPA strategy, 
in which a visit emerges after a series of moves and events between company officers and many 
government officials. Certain actions and events may seem minor and seemingly inconsequential 
at the time but end up resulting in a significant outcome such as a visit (Allison, 1971). 
The question for this study is what financial benefits flow to a company practicing this 
particular form of CPA, especially since hosting a visit is more public and entails many direct 
(i.e., planning, security, logistics, public relations, etc.) and indirect (i.e., lost time due to 
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planning the visit) costs that other forms of CPA do not.1 The dominant assumption underscoring 
much of the CPA literature is that managers consciously choose to engage their firms in political 
activities. Oliver and Holzinger (2008) write, “Strategic political management refers to the set of 
strategic actions that firms plan and enact for the purpose of maximizing economic returns from 
the political environment” (p. 496. Emphasis added). The CPA literature commonly asserts that 
firms undertake a rational cost-benefit calculation to direct CPA (i.e., lobbying a legislative 
member or joining an industry coalition in producing a ‘white paper’ about an issue) towards 
issues that look to be most advantageous to the firm (Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005; Henisz 
and Zelner, 2012; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Firms may also choose to undertake CPA to imitate 
others (Gray and Lowery, 1996) and to cement social relations between their managers and 
government officials (Mizruchi, 1992), presumably when the benefits exceed the costs. A 
contribution of our study is that net benefits may also flow to firms that host visits of powerful 
political leaders, even when the deliberate nature of strategic choice is obfuscated. 
Due to information asymmetry, investors face the challenge of evaluating the quality of 
firms. This is particularly true in China where public firms’ disclosure is limited and shareholder 
activism is rare (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005). High information asymmetry between firms and 
investors lead investors to rely on other information cues to make investment decisions. We posit 
that hosting visits by top government officials appears to affect expectations about firm 
performance through two pathways: (1) signals about future flows of government-controlled 
resources; (2) certification effect about the reputation and legitimacy of the host. We discuss 
successively both pathways.  
                                                     
1  Although from a different context, we interviewed the president of a company in the United States that hosted a visit of U.S. President Obama. 
He shared with us many details about him and his senior staff spending several long and intense days prior to the visit with Secret Service agents 
as well as the President’s staff about minute details of the visit (i.e., exact route President would walk; where a stage would be set for a speech; 
where President would stop to shake workers’ hands; etc.). The firm had to pay some of these expenses. Also, during the day prior to and of the 
visit, production in the plant was significantly reduced. 
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Future resource flows from the government could take two forms: promotion and 
protection. In promotion, the visit might signal that the government sees the firm as necessary for 
carrying out important public policies, such as being a leading performer in a sector of the 
economy favored by the government. As such, the visit indicates that the government may be 
willing to promote such a firm or its sector in the future, such as with access to credit and other 
funds, tax incentives, government purchases, or favorable regulations. For example, in August 
2007, Premier Wen visited the Xinjiang Tianye Co., Ltd., a manufacturer of drip irrigation 
technology that was named as a priority project of China’s Western Development Program. The 
Premier commended the firm for its excellent contributions to energy and water conservation, 
such as outlined in the government’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006–2010). The government also 
provided financial and policy support, i.e., The State Council’s approval of the classification of 
drip irrigation products as agricultural products, which enjoy tax-free treatment. If these visits 
are made to high performing firms, additionally it may signal that the government is less willing 
in the future to attempt to confiscate the firm’s resources, such as through taxes, forced 
ownership changes (i.e., giving the state an equity stake or board position), or divestiture of 
certain assets. 
Another form of expected government-controlled resources might be via protection. 
Certain firms and sectors of the economy serve important public functions, such as providing 
employment, fostering regional development (i.e., a large mine in a remotely populated region), 
and enhancing national security (Gilpin, 1987). However, during the period of the study, the 
commercial prospects for some of these firms were dire. The visit may show that the government 
is willing to “prop up” such ailing firms or firms in ailing sectors, including some larger and 
well-known, SOEs. For instance, during his visit to Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corp in 2009, 
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Premier Wen discussed the overcapacity problem in the steel and iron industry and suggested 
that it was imperative to eliminate outdated capacity and make every effort to reduce cost on the 
basis of scientific management. On April 20, 2007, Premier Wen inspected Jiangxi Copper 
Corporation, a company providing important social benefits through employment, and urged the 
firm to accelerate the pace of transforming traditional industries with advanced technology. The 
visit of the high ranking politician shows that the he is willing to stake his own reputation on 
such a public event. The visit may assuage investors who face uncertainty in evaluating whether 
the government will be willing to support firms with resources and favorable regulations.  
The second path linking hosting a visit to investors’ reaction is via certification. The 
certification literature considers the effect of a company’s affiliation with prominent others, such 
as in this case, high ranking senior government officials, on third parties such as investors. 
Although a large segment of the certification suggests that it is a process in which a central 
institutional actor with authority and status formally acknowledges that a venture meets a 
particular standard (Sine, David, and Mitsuhashi, 2007: 578; Rao, 1994), another segment 
suggests that it is the association itself with such critical actors that represents an endorsement or 
certification (Kleer, 2010; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). We focus on this latter body of 
literature where certification is created by status association. Status association has been 
especially important in the literature on entrepreneurial or small firms that lack legitimacy. For 
example, “drawing on arguments from liabilities of newness and certification literatures,” 
Söderblom and colleagues (2015: 1501) find that receiving a government subsidy provides an 
endorsement for new ventures creating legitimacy for their business model and enabling them to 
receive more capital and enhance survival. Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) report that newer 
firms entering into cooperative relationships with higher status partners enjoy the certification of 
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legitimacy, because such relationships “act as endorsements that influence perceptions of the 
quality of young organizations when unambiguous measures of quality do not exist or cannot be 
observed” (p. 315). 
Certification signals to investors and others about unobservable firm attributes that may 
contribute to its future performance and ability to continue as a “going concern” (King, Lenox, 
and Terlaak, 2005; Rindova et al., 2005). A firm’s associations with “long-lived players”, such 
as senior officials in a one-party authoritarian government like China, in a policymaking process 
that is “far from transparent” (Kennedy, 2005: 52), represent a valuable firm resource that is 
revealed to third parties, at least in part, through visits (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). In 
emerging economies, a firm’s relationships with political actors contribute importantly towards 
competitive advantage (Peng and Luo, 2000). Kennedy writes that business involvement in 
policymaking in China is typically non-confrontational and involves “sharing views” and 
“exchanging ideas” (2005: 51). The assumption is that the visibility and prominence of the visit 
conveys important information about the firm’s relationship with the powerful politicians from 
company insiders to less informed investing outsiders.  
We offer two examples about how visits by the President and the Premier may certify 
firm’s innovative capability. On August 11, 2005, Premier Wen inspected Sany Group, a private 
multinational heavy machinery manufacturing firm, and praised the firm’s strong innovation and 
entrepreneurship as well as product competitiveness. On August 22, 2005, President Hu 
inspected Fiberhome Technologies Group, an information technology and telecommunications 
company, and commended the firm’s extraordinary efforts to self-develop core technology and 
independent innovation capability. 
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Certification by authoritative institutional actors might affect the general impression that 
is formed about the firm’s reputation and legitimacy. Reputation refers to the perceptions by 
external stakeholders about the firm’s dispositions to behave in a particular manner (Basdeo et 
al., 2006), ability to deliver along key dimensions of performance (Rindova and Fonbrun, 1999) 
and to create value (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006: 54). Hosting a visit puts a firm in 
contact with the most prominent member of the national government, a high status exchange 
partner (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006), raising the firm’s social prominence, a key component of 
organizational reputation (Rindova et al., 2005). Shane and Foo (1999: 144) argue that 
certification by powerful institutional actors is one of the most important mechanisms for firms 
to gain “socio-political legitimacy,” defined as the extent to which a firm conforms to recognized 
principles and standards (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). If a firm is perceived by third parties to have 
political and social capital, it may be able to enhance stakeholder cooperation and reduce 
stakeholder conflict, both of which are beneficial (Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014). In 
sum, the certification function of hosting visits communicates externally about unobserved firm 
attributes and impressions about its reputation and legitimacy, all of which are associated with 
future value.  
The presence of the Chinese President or Premier at company sites acts to reduce 
information asymmetries of investors about the firm’s expectations of receipt of government-
controlled resources as well as elevate the firm’s reputation and socio-political legitimacy via the 
certification effect. These pathways reduce the information search costs and increase investors’ 
confidence, leading to a decrease in the firm’s costs of obtaining capital (Bosch and Steffen, 
2011; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Sine et al., 2007; Söderblom et al., 2015) and also may 
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increase perceptions about the firm’s socio-political stability (Bertoni and Lugo, 2014). As such, 
investors are expected to respond favorably to firms hosting such visits. 
H1: Firms hosting high ranking government officials experience positive abnormal stock 
market reactions surrounding visit dates. 
 
Contingency Factors 
Our central hypothesis that firms benefit from hosting visits of high ranking government 
officials does not differentiate across the types of firms that might enjoy financial gains from 
such an activity. However, firms differ considerably in what is known by investors about their 
access to government-controlled resources. Firms also differ in their reputation and socio-
political legitimacy. Drawing upon studies that show that firm-level characteristics affect the 
ability of firms to cope with external uncertainties (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), we posit that 
companies vary in how hosting visits affects financial performance. In this section, we introduce 
four firm-level factors that influence the types of firms expected to benefit most from visits of 
high ranking government officials: (1) prior financial performance; (2) private ownership (versus 
SOE); (3) top management teams’ political connections; and (4) location characteristics of the 
hosting firm. Each of these variables represents key contextual situations in China. 
Prior Financial Performance. Firms that have experienced disappointing financial 
returns may witness higher levels of abnormal market returns upon a visit by high ranking 
central government officials than firms with stronger financial performance. Weaker performers 
generate less income than stronger performers to buffer against hostile elements of the external 
environment. Weaker performers may also face more difficulties in finding capital. The visit 
may signal that the government is willing to provide certain resources, a protectionist role. 
Furthermore, weak financial performance has been associated with negative reputation (Fombrun 
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and Shanley, 1990). For poor performers, the visit reassures investors about the firm’s reputation 
and legitimacy. In another context, Bertoni and Lugo (2011) demonstrate that sovereign wealth 
funds were more likely than other institutional investors to commit resources to distressed firms 
so that they became economically viable – as such, other investors received a certification effect 
from sovereign wealth fund participation. As a result of resource concerns and damage to 
reputation and legitimacy related to their performance, poorly performing firms are expected to 
experience a larger effect on their value from hosting than firms with stronger prior performance.  
H2: The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and stock 
market reactions will be stronger when hosting firms have weaker prior financial 
performance. 
 
Private Firms. China’s economic transition led to the emergence of diverse ownership 
types for business enterprises (Jefferson and Su, 2006). Prior to the economic reforms in 1978, 
the Chinese economy was dominated by SOEs and collectively-owned enterprises (Peng, Tan, 
and Tong, 2004). Since the reforms, the Chinese economy witnessed a surge of privately owned 
firms, shareholding corporations, and foreign invested firms (Steinfeld, 2010).  
Privately-controlled firms generally have two disadvantages compared to SOEs. First, 
private firms typically receive less state support (access to state-controlled credit, subsidies, 
grants) and experience more bureaucratic and regulatory burdens. Second, privately owned firms 
may have less legitimacy given the historical focus of SOEs on joint social welfare and profit 
orientation (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2001). As such, we predict that privately-controlled firms – 
those controlled by non-governmental entities, Chinese citizens, or foreign investors – benefit 
from visits more than SOEs. Investors may already assume that SOEs enjoy important 
government-controlled resources, which will keep them viable. In contrast, investors may not 
fully see that private firms possess such resources and overall view them as more volatile than 
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SOEs. Likewise, comparable SOEs may be seen as more legitimate than private firms; as such, 
hosting a visit may improve a private firm’s reputation and legitimacy, also valued by 
stakeholders (Barnett, 2007). 
H3: The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and 
stock market reactions will be stronger when hosting firms are private firms. 
 
Top Managers’ Political Connections. Some top managers of Chinese companies have 
direct personal connections to government officials through their prior experience of working in 
government organizations. Such political connections are particularly valuable in the Chinese 
business context (Chen, Chen, and Xin, 2004; Li and Zhang, 2007; You and Du, 2012), although 
the relationship is complex. On the one hand, some studies find that as senior managers and 
directors have more political connections, their firms will enjoy superior financial performance 
(Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Li and Zhang, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000). On the other hand, 
other studies report that Chinese firms with extensive political connections innovate less (White 
et al., 2008), retain fewer business experts on their boards (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007), and 
realize worse financial performance (Nee, Opper, and Wong, 2007) than firms with fewer 
political connections. 
Despite the ambiguity, we argue that firms with fewer political connections will benefit 
from visits by senior government officials more than firms with many political connections. 
Hosting visits provides an opportunity for firms with fewer connections to have a direct pathway 
to key political decision-makers who control extensive resources. By fostering information 
exchange and relationship building government official’s visits also help to lower the ex ante and 
ex post political exchange costs (Henisz and Zelner, 2005) for firms without previously personal 
ties to the government through their top managers. Hosting a visit puts a firm in contact with 
high status public officials (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006), raising the firm’s social prominence 
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that is part of organizational reputation (Rindova et al., 2005). Firms without many top manager 
ties to the government may especially enjoy the reputational benefits of hosting a visit.  
H4: The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and stock 
market reactions will be stronger when the percentage of top managers with political 
connections is lower. 
 
 Location (Institutional Development). The quality of local institutions plays an important 
role in the scope and cost of transactions (North, 1990). Within China, institutional quality varies 
substantially across regions (Xu, 2011). Where regional quality is strong, we expect that the 
discipline of the market pressures firms to strive to remain competitive. Several studies about 
Chinese firms offer support; such as where regional institutions are strong, firms emphasize 
customer needs (Davies and Walters, 2004), invest in R&D and intellectual property (Zhou, 
2014), and reinvest profits into the business (Cull and Xu, 2005) more so than their counterparts 
located in provinces with less developed formal institutions. In contrast, firms located in regions 
with weak formal institutions are less likely to be disciplined by markets (Chang and Wu, 2014) 
and may be less competitive than firms from more developed regions (Witt and Lewin, 2007). 
Firms may face higher levels of meddling by government officials in institutionally weak regions 
compared to stronger regions (Doh et al., 2003). 
 A visit by senior government officials to a company located in a less developed region 
may communicate important information to investors. Since the rule of law is less developed in 
these regions, the state faces weaker constraints in exercising its power and thus firms (and other 
interests) are more dependent on their relationships with these state political actors than in more 
institutionally developed regions. Thus, a visit to a company in a less institutionally developed 
region signals that the firm needs political connections to access state-controlled resources. 
Companies operating in less developed regions may also be seen as less reputable and have 
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lower socio-political legitimacy ceteris paribus than companies in more developed regions (Shi, 
Sun, and Peng, 2012). As such we predict the expected resources and reputation and legitimacy 
effects of a government official visit to companies in less institutionally developed regions may 
be greater than for companies located in higher institutionally developed regions. 
H5: The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and stock 





Our sample includes firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 
2003–2011. Firms listed on this stock exchange are larger, more prominent, and well-known than 
non-listed companies. During this timeframe, the Chinese government was led by President Hu 
and Premier Wen. We use the following criteria to select our sample firms. First, we consider a 
focal firm to be one that has hosted visits by The President or The Premier. We focus on the two 
top-level central government officials for three reasons. Foremost, as we mentioned previously, 
the President and the Premier are two most powerful political leaders in China and their visits 
received great attention from the media and investors. Second, visits by these two high-level 
central government officials, though brief, are rare and can be secretive in their planning and 
details of such officials’ schedules may not be released beforehand. Thus, the market may not 
have much information about these events until they occur. Third, the visits of local government 
officials to firms are quite commonplace and therefore are not expected to send a valid signal of 
future resource flows to and bestow a strong certification effect on hosting companies. 
Additionally, we exclude “Special Treatment” (ST) firms because its designation means a firm is 
in dire financial condition and may be delisted (Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011).  
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We follow three steps to collect the visit dates. First, we search company websites of all 
the firms belonging to the Shanghai Stock A Share Index. Because visits by high level national 
government officials usually attest to the company’s achievements, Chinese companies almost 
always advertise such visits through their company websites. In this sense, we assume that 
companies willingly reveal information about the visits. We use the date of the visit as our event 
dates. In no cases did we find that a visit was publicized before the date of the visit. To rule out 
confounding events, we check whether other extraordinary events occurred at the focal firm 
around the visit dates (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Specifically, we exclude five visits to 
firms located in natural disaster-stricken regions immediately after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. 
We also exclude two firms that hosted official visits that occurred just after their initial public 
offerings, because we are unable to collect prior stock price data necessary to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns. Through these steps, we collect 84 visit events by President Hu and 
Premier Wen. 
The source of our data on daily stock prices is the China Stock Market Trading Database 
(CSMAR). Firm financial and other data are also collected from CSMAR. We collected lower-
level officials visit data and top managers’ political background information from company 
websites and other sources. 
Variables 
Our dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm, is calculated 
through the event study methodology, explained in detail below.  
We use four independent variables to test the second order hypotheses. To measure firm 
financial performance, we use return on assets (ROA) lagged one year prior to the visit. Private 
firm is a dummy variable that is coded as “1” if a firm’s controlling shareholder is not the 
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Chinese central or local government and “0” otherwise. Percentage of top managers with 
political connections is measured as the percentage of top managers with political connections. 
We deem a top manager having political connections if he or she has worked in the government 
(Fan et al., 2007). We consider the level of institutional development of the province where the 
focal firm is headquartered, using data from the NERI Index (Fan and Wang, 2011). More 
institutionally developed provinces receive higher NERI Index scores.2  
We include the following firm-level control variables. We control for firm size and firm 
age. Firm size is measured by taking the logarithm of total assets of the focal firm. Firm age is 
measured as the number of years between the establishment year and the visit year. Larger and 
older firms may have higher levels of sociopolitical legitimacy as well as more resources 
available for a range of political activities (Kennedy, 2005; Wang and Qian, 2011) than smaller 
and younger firms (Peng and Luo, 2000). We control for debt ratio (total long-term debt divided 
by total assets) because firms with high leverage are in a more urgent need of resources and 
legitimacy potentially produced by visits. We control for R&D intensity as the ratio of the 
number of R&D personnel divided by the total number of employees (Scherer, 1965) because  
high level of information asymmetry is associated with R&D intensive firms. We control for 
stock return volatility as firms with high stock return volatility may experience a larger CAR in 
the presence of visits. Stock return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of prior year’s 
monthly stock returns. We also include the following variables related to firm governance. We 
control for ownership concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of the top ten owners, 
because ownership concentration influences investors’ evaluation of a firm (Wruck, 1989). We 
                                                     
2 Three visits occurred abroad. Our results are largely consistent if we exclude these three visits from our analyses. 
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control for board independence and CEO duality because these two variables are related to firm 
governance quality (Dalton et al., 2007) which in turn influences investors’ evaluation of a firm.  
Furthermore, we include the following variables to rule out alternative explanations. We 
control for industry concentration, measured by using the common four-firm concentration ratio 
(Shepherd, 1990) for each industry based on the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) industry classification, because it may be related to the returns from CPA (Esty and 
Caves, 1983) and partial out industry-related effects. We control for gross domestic growth rate 
for the province where a firm is located because the economic condition of the province where a 
firm is located may affect investors’ sentiments. We also control for a firm’s political capital by 
counting the accumulative number of visit officials (provincial, ministerial, and municipal-level 
political leaders) in a year. Because this variable is highly skewed, we take the natural log of the 
variable plus one. We control for change in firm visibility because visits by high-level officials 
can increase firm visibility which in turn can influence stock price. To create this measure, we 
conduct keyword searches, using Baidu, the most widely used search engine in China, on news 
about both treatment and control firms before and after a visit date. For instance, if a company 
hosted a visit on June 20, 2006, we count the number of search hits (with company name as 
search term) from June 20, 2006 to June 26, 2006—defined as post-visit firm visibility. We also 
count the number of search hits from June 6, 2006 to June 13, 2006—defined as pre-visit firm 
visibility. We exclude the period of June 13, 2006 to June 20, 2006—the week immediately prior 
to visits because this period could be contaminated by potential leakage about these visits. We 
use the difference between post-visit firm visibility and pre-visit firm visibility to measure the 
change in firm visibility. The value of change in firm visibility is highly skewed and can be 
negative. To address skewness, we identify the minimum value of change in firm visibility and 
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take the natural logarithm of (change in firm visibility + |minimum value of change in firm 
visibility| + 1).  
Empirical Strategy 
The most straightforward strategy to test Hypothesis 1 is to examine whether firms 
hosting official visits experience positive stock returns compared with the situation in the 
absence of such visits (i.e., the counterfactual). To test Hypotheses 2–5, we could investigate 
whether factors proposed in these hypotheses influence the variation of CARs among hosting 
firms. Yet, unobservable firm characteristics and events may drive whether a firm receives a visit 
and stock market reactions. For instance, favorable industry events may coincide with the 
official’s visit, yielding positive stock market reactions and confounding the visit’s influence. To 
attenuate biases arising from unobservable firm characteristics and events, we identify hosting 
firms’ comparable peers and compare stock market performance of hosts with that of peers. 
We form a matched sample of control companies that did not receive visits from high 
ranking government officials. We first exactly match on CSRC industry classifications and visit 
years. We then match on a propensity score estimated based on firm size (the natural log of total 
assets), firm performance (ROA), and firm value (Tobin’s Q). We use a logit regression to 
estimate the propensity score. We conduct t-tests to verify whether non-hosting (control) firms 
and hosting (treatment) firms differ from each other along firm size, firm performance, and firm 
value. Results from t-tests indicate that hosting and non-hosting firms do not significantly differ 
from each other along our matching criteria.  
To investigate the change in the value of the firm resulting from the visits by high 
ranking governmental officials, we adopt the event study methodology in Brown and Warner 
(1985) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997). Event studies are oftentimes used to evaluate firm-
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specific outcomes from political events (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Milyo, 2014) 
and in strategy studies using Chinese stock market data (Gaur, Maholtra, and Zhu, 2013). We 
select an event window of [0, +1], meaning that we consider the day of the event and the next 
day. We believe that a two-day event window captures the market reaction to the official’s visits 
while minimizing the potential for confounding events that may occur during the window. 
The estimation window is [-210, -11], which covers 200 trading days for each firm 
between 210 days and 10 days prior to the event, with at least 30-day’s stock return data 
available. The abnormal return for the portfolio, ARt, on day t is estimated by: 
ARt=Rt-[α+β*Rmt] 
where Rt is the daily stock return and Rmt is the daily total-value-weighted congregated market 
returns on day t. Abnormal returns are residuals from the standard market model as previously 
specified. 
Cumulative abnormal returns, CARt, for the portfolio between [0, +1] are calculated by 
summing abnormal returns: 
CAR[0, +1]=ΣAR[0, +1] 
We have 84 cases in our sample of officials’ visits. Following the same procedure, we 
calculate CARs for non-hosting firms based on the hosting firms’ visit dates.  
To ameliorate biases from unobservable firm characteristics and events, we follow 
Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) and include a control for treatment in regressions used to test 
our hypotheses. Specifically, we first run a standard probit regression with whether a firm 
received a visit as dependent variable. In the first-stage probit regression, we include all the 
variables used to predict CARs. To ensure identification of the model, we need an instrumental 
variable that influences whether a firm receives a visit or not but does not influence CARs 
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(Lennox, et al., 2012). Our instrument is based upon a quasi-natural experiment introduced by 
the 2005 Split-Share Structure Reform (Liao, Liu, and Wang, 2014). A characteristic of the 
Chinese capital market before the Reform was a split-share structure where almost 70% of listed 
firms’ outstanding shares were non-tradable shares and mainly held by stockholders, including 
controlling shareholders, whereas the remaining shares were tradable and mostly held by 
domestic individuals and institutional investors (Liao et al., 2014). In 2005, the CSRC 
introduced the Split-Share Structure Reform to convert non-tradable shares into tradable shares. 
Participation in the Split-Share Structure Reform was mandatory.  
Specifically, the instrument is a pre-reform dummy that receives a value of “1” for firms 
that went through the 2005 Split-Share Structure Reform for years 2003–2005 and a value of “0” 
otherwise. This instrument is relevant because the government may have the need to understand 
firms that would go through the Reform and choose to visit these firms. Because the Reform was 
at the discretion of the Chinese government and individual firms had no direct control over the 
Reform, our instrument can be perceived as exogenous to firm CARs. Based on the first-stage 
regression, we calculate the treatment correction (Greene, 2012; Heckman, 1979; Lennox, et al., 
2012) and include it as a control in the second-stage regressions.  
RESULTS 
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for both hosting and non-hosting firms. The 
correlation between hosting firms (versus non-hosting firms) and CAR is 22% and statistically 
significant.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 shows the differences in CAR between treatment and control firms. The CAR for 
treatment firms is 0.9% whereas the CAR for control firms is -0.5% and the difference is 
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statistically significant based on t-test (t = 2.89), consistent with Hypothesis 1. In addition, we 
find that hosting firms’ CARs are statistically different from “0” as its confidence interval does 
not include “0” (t = 2.60), but non-hosting firms’ CARs are not statistically different from “0” as 
its confidence interval includes “0” (t = -1.46).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In addition, Figure 1 plots the average CARs for the hosting and non-hosting firms from 
day (-7) to day (+14). We do not find a significant difference for the average CARs prior to day 
(0) [i.e., CAR(-7,-1)], and the difference shows up at day (0) as 0.93% [i.e. CAR(-7,0)], grows 
thereafter and reaches 2.89% at day (+11) [i.e., CAR(-7,+11)]. Figure 1 also indicates that 
control (competitor) firms appear to be hurt by not hosting official visits. We speculate that 
investors may increase their holdings in hosting firms and reduce their holdings in control firms, 
resulting in a crowding out effect. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Table 3 reports results used to test our hypotheses. Model 1 is the first-stage probit 
regression used to predict whether a firm receives a visit within a firm year. The coefficient 
estimate of pre-reform dummy is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.548, p = 0.043).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
To test our hypotheses, we use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions as some 
companies in our sample have hosted multiple visits by high-level officials during the 2003–
2011 period. We cluster standard errors by firms to address potential residual correlation of the 
same firm (Petersen, 2009). Model 2 in Table 3 introduces Hosting firm, a dummy variable that 
receives a value of “1” if a firm receives a visit and “0” otherwise. Model 2 includes the 
treatment correction calculated from the first-stage probit regression. Results from Model 2 show 
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that the coefficient estimate of Hosting firm (β = 0.015) is positive and associated with a p-value 
of 0.002, lending support to Hypothesis 1. In terms of economic significance, the CARs of 
hosting firms are 1.5% higher than that of control firms.  
Models 3–7 are used to test Hypotheses 2 through 5. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the 
positive stock market reaction that hosting firms witness should be stronger for firms with 
weaker prior financial performance. In Model 3, the coefficient estimate of Hosting firm × Firm 
performance is negative and statistically significant (β = -0.151, p = 0.014) supporting 
Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts the positive stock market reaction that hosting firms experience 
should be stronger if the firms are privately-owned. In Model 4, the coefficient estimate of 
Hosting firm × Private firm is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.026, p = 0.043), 
supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that the positive stock market reaction that hosting firms realize 
should be stronger if the firms’ top managers are less politically connected. In Model 5, the 
coefficient of Hosting firm × Political connection is negative but statistically not significant (β = 
-0.043, p = 0.451), failing to support Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the positive stock market reaction that hosting firms 
experience should be more salient for firms located in institutionally less developed provinces. 
Model 6 shows that the coefficient estimate of Hosting firm × Institutional development is 
negative but statistically not significant (β = -0.004, p = 0.152) failing to support Hypothesis 5. 
Model 7 is the saturated model with all the interaction terms and we continue to find that 
the coefficient estimates of Hosting firm × Firm performance and Hosting firm × Private firm 
are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions.  
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Model 8 compares CAR variations only among the 84 hosting firms. Consistent with 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, we find that the coefficient estimate of Firm performance is negative and 
statistically significant (β = -0.149, p = 0.064, two-tailed test) and that of Private firm is positive 
and statistically significant (β = 0.036, p = 0.002).  
DISCUSSION 
 We set out to examine the value to Chinese publicly-traded companies that received visits 
of high ranking central government officials. Examining 84 visits over the period 2003–2011 by 
President Hu and Premier Wen, we show that hosting firms experienced significant and positive 
stock market gains. On average, the valuation of hosting companies rose 0.9%. The hosting firms 
also outperformed the matched firms within the 14-day window, suggesting that visits may 
crowd out investment to non-hosting competitors. It seems evident that hosting the visits of the 
President and Premier functions to improve investors’ evaluation of firms.  
We offer two pathways as to how visits might influence the evaluation of the hosts by 
third parties: (1) expectations about the firm’s receipt of government-controlled resources; and 
(2) certification about the firm’s reputation and legitimacy. Based upon assumptions about 
information asymmetries about firms by third parties, such as investors, and government officials 
having policy preferences that might be served in part by firms, a visit conveys valuable 
information. The first pathway is that the visit may indicate that the government is willing to 
offer resources at a future date to the visited firm. For example, Tebian Electric Apparatus 
Company (TBEA), a large electric equipment and solar equipment company received several 
visits from high ranking central government officials between 2006 and 2010, including hosting 
Premier Wen in 2007. During this period, TBEA received shares of two large scale government 
power projects (TBEA, 2009), demonstration of promotion via government-controlled resources. 
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Visits also might indicate that government-controlled resources will flow to protect a hosting 
firm. For example, on January 27, 2007, President Hu visited Jilin Sino-Microelectronics Co., 
Ltd. and stressed both the importance of enhancing independent innovation capability and that 
local governments should seize opportunities created by national policies of revitalizing the old 
industrial base in the Northeast China. Subsequently, in 2009, the company enjoyed preferential 
tax policies from the local government. 
Additionally, conducting non-random post hoc analysis, we collected data from the 
footnotes of annual reports on all kinds of subsidies that firms received from the government 
during the two years after the visits. We find that firms that hosted a visit on average received a 
subsidy of RMB 912 million Yuan and comparable non-hosting firms on average received a 
subsidy of RMB 271 million Yuan and the difference is statistically significant (t = 2.2). This 
finding appears consistent with the resource flows argument, suggesting that resources flow to 
firms after the visits consistent with our promotion and protection arguments and providing some 
evidence regarding actual effect size. 
The second pathway that a visit might influence investors’ reactions is through the 
certification effect. The certification effect of the firm’s association with powerful and 
prestigious government officials, high status exchange partners (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006), 
raises a firm’s social prominence, which feeds into its reputation and socio-political legitimacy. 
Reputation refers to the perceptions by external stakeholders about the firm’s dispositions to 
behave in a particular manner (Basdeo et al., 2006) and its ability to deliver along key 
dimensions of performance (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999) and create value (Rindova et al., 
2006). Socio-political legitimacy describes that match of a firm’s activities to recognized 
principles and standards (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). The initial analysis shows that investors 
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positively value the firms that host such visits. For example, in a visit to KPC Pharmaceuticals in 
October of 2004, Premier Wen praised the firm for its investments in production equipment and 
quality control processes that allowed it to produce medicines of the highest quality. 
 The results from the secondary analysis predominantly support the dual pathways about 
hosting’s effect on investor valuation. First, firms with weaker financial performance received a 
positive financial boost from government official visits. It appears that the visits of these high 
ranking officials signal to investors that the government has positive preferences towards such 
firms and will free up resources, lowering the uncertainty. As financially weaker firms suffer 
from lower reputations, visits might certify leaders’ confidence raising the hosting firm’s 
reputation and legitimacy. Private firms also benefited more than SOEs from hosting visits. 
Visits indicate that private firms have access to government-controlled resources that 
complement their market strategies, something that private firms generally are disadvantaged 
compared to SOEs. Visits also create publicity which appears to elevate the reputation of private 
firms more than SOEs. Shareholders have been seen to value a private firm’s reputation and 
legitimacy (Barnett, 2007). 
However, our results fail to support Hypotheses 4 and 5, which stated that stock market 
reactions are expected to be greater for firms with fewer top managers’ political connections and 
for firms located in institutionally less developed provinces. This may imply that the signal of 
future resource flows and the certification effect of hosting high ranking government official 
visits were sufficiently great to be enjoyed by all the hosts regardless of their prior political 





Limitations and Future Research 
 As with most empirical investigations, we did not have all of the data that we desired. It 
would have been ideal to include the visits by government officials to Chinese companies 
without publicly-listed shares. We limited our visits to those by the top two officials from the 
central government. In doing so, we neglected the visits by other central government officials as 
well as the more numerous visits by officials from provincial and municipal governments, 
although we controlled for such visits. With the exception of SOEs, we did not examine other 
mechanisms that the state uses to control firms. We also did not have data about the costs of 
hosting visits. It could be that firms face significant direct and indirect costs, plus ex post 
opportunity costs (i.e., being forced to conduct politically desired but uneconomic business 
activities) connected with hosting visits. The political context of China, i.e., authoritarian, 
opaque, single party, may not generalize well to other countries, although examining a country 
with substantial centralized control, such as in Russia and Saudi Arabia, should enhance the 
importance of CPA on firm performance. 
Future researchers might examine additional political activities that Chinese firms use to 
engage government officials. Other activities include firm participation in trade associations, 
firm direct lobbying (Kennedy, 2005), participation in the People’s Congress and People’s 
Consultative Conference (Jia, 2014), and corporate social responsibility (Henisz et al., 2014). 
Lastly, although we undertake efforts to mitigate endogeneity concerns (e.g., matching sample 
and inclusion of a treatment correction control), these econometric methods rely on their specific 
assumptions. Future research may use natural experiments (e.g., Fisman, 2001) to empirically 





Hosting visits of high ranking government officials, an emergent CPA strategy, appears 
to be valuable for firms. Our examination confirms that firms hosting visits of the President and 
Premier experienced significant financial gains over similar non-hosting firms. Furthermore, the 
firms that benefited the most were those with weaker prior period profits and those with private 
(not state) ownership. Overall, we argue that firms’ performance is expected to improve based 
upon two effects of hosting visits. First, hosting a visit signals that the government might be 
willing to furnish resources benefiting the host or its sector. For example, the government might 
be willing to release resources to promote the sector, such as favorable financing for investments 
in the government’s preferred technologies or policies to push the firm’s (and sector’s) products 
into domestic and international markets. The government might also be willing to protect ailing 
firms; for example, provide grants to continue production in areas favored by senior government 
officials or enact regulations to limit competition. Second, hosting a visit may certify the 
reputation and the legitimacy of hosting firms. Because of the status association with high profile 
actors, certification improves the impression formed by third parties about the firm’s reputation 
and legitimacy. The potential to receive government-controlled resources and enhance reputation 
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Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 CAR 0.002 0.031 1.000
2 Visit firm 0.500 0.501 0.219 1.000
3 Firm size 23.294 1.816 0.032 0.034 1.000
4 Firm age 10.714 4.807 -0.098 -0.142 -0.243 1.000
5 Debt ratio 0.078 0.104 0.087 -0.030 0.241 0.146 1.000
6 R&D intensity 0.139 0.146 0.181 0.177 -0.071 -0.068 -0.148 1.000
7 Stock return volatility 0.142 0.060 0.058 0.065 0.065 0.277 0.062 0.002 1.000
8 Ownership concentration 0.542 0.312 0.072 -0.098 0.465 -0.390 0.159 0.060 -0.035 1.000
9 Board independence 0.550 0.715 0.014 -0.145 0.073 0.023 0.066 0.060 -0.040 -0.013 1.000
10 CEO duality 0.083 0.277 -0.007 0.129 -0.180 0.198 -0.063 -0.043 0.163 -0.268 -0.080 1.000
11 Industry concentration 0.410 0.234 0.076 0.093 0.372 -0.276 -0.014 -0.001 0.024 0.107 -0.066 -0.069 1.000
12 Accumulative visit officials (Log) 1.665 2.078 -0.051 0.180 0.279 -0.003 0.039 -0.101 0.054 -0.070 0.102 0.001 0.237 1.000
13 Firm visibility change (Log) 3.839 0.374 0.153 -0.131 0.113 -0.100 0.091 -0.057 -0.078 0.058 0.183 -0.126 0.074 0.129 1.000
14 GDP growth rate 0.154 0.063 -0.002 0.079 -0.296 -0.014 0.059 -0.094 -0.289 -0.157 0.056 0.141 -0.317 0.005 0.069 1.000
15 Firm performance 0.060 0.069 0.032 0.173 0.196 -0.194 -0.057 -0.061 0.011 0.161 -0.032 0.037 0.249 0.033 -0.033 -0.067 1.000
16 Private firms 0.256 0.438 0.124 -0.041 -0.240 0.285 -0.010 -0.117 0.132 -0.282 0.356 0.317 -0.198 -0.026 -0.038 0.211 0.052 1.000
17 TMT political connections 0.030 0.066 0.125 -0.005 -0.003 -0.041 -0.105 -0.128 0.042 -0.057 -0.094 0.027 0.098 -0.100 0.036 -0.084 -0.050 0.013 1.000
18 Institutional development 8.646 1.780 0.017 -0.085 0.255 -0.030 -0.327 0.175 0.063 0.068 -0.036 0.038 0.160 -0.141 0.044 -0.241 -0.091 -0.046 0.120 1.000
Absolute value of correlations greater than .13 significant at p<.05.







Table 2. Matching results: Differences in CAR between hosting and non-hosting firms   
Treatment N Mean S.D. [95% Confidence interval] t-statistics 
0 84 -0.005 0.030 [-0.011, 0.002] -1.460 
1 84 0.009 0.031 [0.002, 0.016] 2.600 
Difference  0.014     


















































Table 3. Officials’ visits and stock market reactions       
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable Probit OLS 
Constant -0.191 -0.071 -0.062 -0.067 -0.074 -0.089 -0.074 0.017 
 [0.945] [0.129] [0.173] [0.159] [0.123] [0.065] [0.120] [0.820] 
Firm size 0.126 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.173] [0.848] [0.792] [0.682] [0.831] [0.882] [0.638] [0.182] 
Firm age -0.060 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 [0.040] [0.469] [0.543] [0.721] [0.486] [0.320] [0.650] [0.630] 
Debt ratio 0.470 0.037 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.014 
 [0.716] [0.216] [0.244] [0.202] [0.211] [0.233] [0.243] [0.765] 
R&D intensity 3.090 0.040 0.030 0.045 0.039 0.038 0.033 -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.018] [0.079] [0.008] [0.019] [0.026] [0.058] [0.992] 
Stock return volatility 4.858 0.017 0.019 0.002 0.020 0.018 0.008 -0.006 
 [0.040] [0.662] [0.612] [0.961] [0.599] [0.643] [0.824] [0.914] 
Ownership concentration -0.988 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.048 
 [0.027] [0.213] [0.202] [0.099] [0.203] [0.393] [0.175] [0.010] 
Board independence -0.384 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 0.011 
 [0.031] [0.428] [0.475] [0.873] [0.458] [0.430] [0.996] [0.162] 
CEO duality 0.781 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006 -0.014 -0.020 
 [0.097] [0.512] [0.415] [0.151] [0.561] [0.462] [0.105] [0.143] 
Industry concentration -0.424 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.013 
 [0.468] [0.402] [0.446] [0.288] [0.445] [0.358] [0.326] [0.467] 
Accumulative visits officials (Log) 0.120 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.049] [0.317] [0.325] [0.288] [0.299] [0.286] [0.248] [0.352] 
Firm visibility change (Log) -0.755 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.027 
 [0.146] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
GDP growth rate 3.252 -0.007 -0.016 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.046 
 [0.140] [0.863] [0.682] [0.977] [0.878] [0.894] [0.871] [0.449] 
Firm performance 3.453 -0.014 0.062 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.071 -0.149 
 [0.054] [0.695] [0.122] [0.713] [0.721] [0.730] [0.077] [0.064] 
Private firm -0.093 0.018 0.017 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.004 0.036 
 [0.762] [0.013] [0.014] [0.568] [0.014] [0.011] [0.625] [0.002] 
TMT political connection 1.437 0.065 0.065 0.067 0.085 0.061 0.080 0.029 
 [0.401] [0.039] [0.020] [0.016] [0.024] [0.039] [0.006] [0.531] 
Institutional development -0.072 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 [0.336] [0.894] [0.979] [0.995] [0.915] [0.412] [0.364] [0.928] 
Pre-reform 0.548        
 [0.043]        
Selection correction  -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 -0.044 
  [0.281] [0.099] [0.184] [0.274] [0.409] [0.095] [0.058] 
Hosting firm  0.015 0.025 0.009 0.016 0.047 0.049  
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.072] [0.003] [0.050] [0.057]  
Hosting firm    -0.152    -0.164  
   x Firm performance   [0.014]    [0.007]  
Hosting firm     0.026   0.026  
   x Private firm    [0.043]   [0.047]  
Hosting firm      -0.043  -0.034  
  x Political connection     [0.451]  [0.479]  
Hosting firm       -0.004 -0.003  
  x Institutional development      [0.152] [0.219]  
         
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 84 
R-squared  0.204 0.226 0.228 0.206 0.214 0.261 0.320 
Pseudo R-squared 0.207               











       Treatment group: firms (84) that hosted a visit of the President or Premier. 
Control group: non-hosting firms (84) that are matched to each host. 
































































APPENDIX I. Visit examples and suggested type of information 
Company  Visit date Official Type Event 
Mongolia North 






Premier Wen was delighted to observe that these traditional enterprises 
took advantage of advanced technology transform traditional industry 
and improve technical skills and competitiveness. 
Yonyou Network 





Premier Wen commented that the software industry was a sunrise 
industry and encouraged the firm to strengthen existing innovative 
capability.  




Premier Wen expressed his hope that the company should seize the 
unprecedented opportunity in the locomotive industry to become a 








President Hu stressed that the firm should take advantage of the strong 
science and technology capability in the old industrial base and 
capitalize on talents at universities and research institutes to build up a 
market-oriented technological innovation system. 






Premier Wen urged the company to accelerate the pace of transforming 
traditional industries with advanced technology, with an emphasis on 
resource integration and intensive processing to enhance value creation. 






Premier Wen discussed the over-capability problem of the iron and steel 
industry and urged the firm to eliminate overcapacity by means of 
market, laws and environment protection, and make every effort to 







Premier Wen was impressed with the company's achievements and 
commented, “With such equipment and strict processes, your medicines 
can be produced with high quality.”  




Premier Wen praised the firm for its strong innovation and 
entrepreneurship as well as product competitiveness.  
Fiberhome 
Telecommunication 





President Hu praised the firm's core technology and independent 







President Hu affirmed the firm's adoption of new technology and 
equipment with high automation.  
 
